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1LIFEBOAT VERSUS CORPORATE  ETHIC:
implications of stem and joint family systems for health  and  development  outcomel
Monica Das Gupta
Kinship systems profoundly influence our values and social constructs in ways of which we are
usually not conscious. They influence what people learn about appropriate ways of relating with
others, within and outside the family. They shape the relative evaluation of different categories
of members of a household. They shape who people will live with, who they will live for, and
networks of cooperation. Through these pathways, they influence many fundamental aspects of
social  organization  and  behaviour,  which  influence  health  and  demographic  outcomes.  In
addition, they also influence household and group strategies of resource management; migration;
ways of exploiting commercial opportunities; and the operation of civil society.
In this paper, we compare "stem" family systems and "joint" family systems, in order to illustrate
some of the above assertions.  These terms are of  course ambiguous. For  example, there  are
striking differences between the  "stem" family  as found in  Japan 2 and  that  found in various
regions of Western Europe. Here we focus on how differences between kinship systems in norms
of residence and inheritance shape fundamental values and behavioural outcomes.
This interest  in looking at large contrasts between kinship  systems arose  for me while doing
fieldwork in North India, where it seemed difficult to say much about the kinship system because
it  appeared  to  be  so  unremarkable.  Later,  reading  Berkner's  account  of  stem  families  in
eighteenth century Austria revealed how very different kinship arrangements can be. The idea of
some children not inheriting property and not having claims to support from the household, the
idea of parents drawing  up precise retirement contracts with their  children: these suggested a
stunningly different set of relationships between kin from that of North India, where ties between
patrikin are very strong.
Two brief examples give a flavour of the closeness of the ties in North India: "This is my son, or,
if you want to be  precise, we adopted him. I was unable to  bear children, but  my husband's
younger brother married my younger sister and we adopted one of her sons. We all live together
and raise  our children  together",  as well as the  outrage when  obligations  are not met:  "My
brother and I separated our landholdings about thirty years ago when we were in our forties, and--
have lived in neighbouring homes since then. Last year, he bought a tractor which he rents out to
other farmers. But can you imagine, when my son asked to borrow the tractor, my brother asked
him to pay the rent for it! You write that down in your book: My own brother wants to charge me
rent for using his tractor! "
To illustrate some of the features of stem families which distinguish them from joint families,
this paper draws a stylized contrast between the stem family system of Northern Europe and the
joint  family of North India, which has much in common with that of China. The discussion of
stem families is based  on studies of peasant households in eighteenth and  nineteenth century
1  See, for example, Chie Nakane (1967).
2Austria and nineteenth century Scandinavia 2. The discussion of joint families is based on studies
of North India and China3.
The discussion in this paper ignores the actual variation on the ground in the operation of these
family  systems. Such  variation  exists  not  only  between  regions,  but  also  between  different
socio-economic groups within the same region. Of course, individual families also vary in the
precise nature of the arrangements they make. Not only are these forms of variation ignored, but
also the fact that systems change over time. The point of reference in this paper is the family
system which prevailed amongst peasants around the turn of the century, and still prevails to a
considerable extent amongst the peasantry of North India and China.
The stylized version of the family systems presented here highlights their  essential features in
order  to  throw  their  contrasts into relief.  Some hypotheses  are  also  put  forward  as to  how
differences in family systems might influence demographic outcomes. This follows the tradition
of Davis (1955) and Hajnal (1982), who found it useful to compare these family systems in a
stylized way, to derive some theoretical understanding of the implications of family systems for
childbearing behaviour. Here we focus on the implications of these family systems for health
behaviour and health outcomes, and offer some additional hypotheses as to their implications for
other household and group strategies.
We begin with a brief description of the patterns of inheritance and residence in these two family
systems. This serves as a framework for the subsequent discussion of the ways in which these
systems influence health and other outcomes. We argue that norms of inheritance and residence
shape  the  nature  of  intra-family  relationships,  networks  of  cooperation  and  the  relative
evaluation of household members. Several hypotheses about the nature of these interrelationships
are set forth, which can be tested empirically.
I  PATTERNS  OF  INHERITANCE  AND  RESIDENCE  IN  STEM  AND  JOINT
FAMILIES
In the North European stem family system, property was passed on either intact to  one child
(unigeniture) or the bulk  of it was passed on to  one child and  smaller  shares  given to  other
children. Since the system was essentially patrilineal, the inheritance normally passed in the male
line. However, there was a good deal of flexibility in this principle, such that if there were no
sons a daughter and her husband could inherit the property. It could also be passed on to non-kin-.
of the owners' choice, such as an employee who had won the owners' trust. The main objective  -
was to  ensure the continuity of the estate, and  maintaining the  family  line was a  secondary-
objective.
The central event in the household lifecycle was the transfer of property to the heir, which often
took place at the time of his marriage. At some point of their aging, the parents would decide that
it was time for them to retire,  and would transfer the property formally to  the heir. Through
marriage, the heir formed a new partnership to manage the property and run the household. It
2  See for example Arensberg and Kimball (1968),  Berkner (1972), Gaunt (1983, 1987), Plakans (1989), Sieder and
Mitterauer  (1983), and Sorensen (1989).
3  See for example Das Gupta (1995a), Davis and Harrell (1993), Freedman (1965), Gates (1996), Hsu (1948), Karve
(1965), Kessinger (1974), Kolenda (1987), Wolf (1968) and Wolf and Huang (1980).
3was common for  a  formal retirement  contract to  be  drawn up,  specifying  the support to  be
provided by the heir to the retired parents.
Non-heirs or the lesser heirs would leave the main estate at the time of the property transfer if
they had not  already  left before this,  and  would make a  living  through  whatever ecological
niches might be available. One option for them was to find work as labourers on other farms, and
sometimes they could save enough from this to establish a household and raise a family. In times
of  urban  expansion non-agrarian  employment could also  be  found.  Some might  be  able to
remain  for some time  with their retired parents. The heir had few obligations to these people,
although they were usually their own siblings.
Here we term this a "lifeboat ethic", whereby the social and economic position of the farming
family was effectively maintained by removing or highly circumscribing the potential claims of
other  kin  to  support  from  the  household.  Even  the  claims  of  the  parents  were  clearly
circumscribed. The estate was passed on largely intact. In many ways this must have acted as an
incentive to be innovative, both for the heir who did not have to share the benefits of innovation,
and  for  the  others  whose  survival  depended  on  being  able  to  extract  a  living  from  their
environment.
The joint family system of North India and China has a very different logic. To begin with, sons
inherit equal shares of the property, although one son may have the use of additional land if the
parents are living with him. Transfer of property and managerial authority takes place gradually,
beginning with the sons working under the father's direction, and moving on to the sons taking
over some of the managerial decisions as the father ages. Gradually the father becomes only a
titular head. The sons move from cultivating their land jointly, to  cultivating it separately, and
later to formalizing the transfer and division of the estate. This last step often takes place after
the father's death.
Marriage is not a central event in the household lifecycle. Children may marry at any point, and
sons'  wives  can be  incorporated  into  the  household  whether  or  not  the  son  is  financially
independent. The household and property management is conducted by the unit of the father and
his sons, with the help of the women married into the family. Thus marriage does not create a
new partnership which  is of much significance, other than importing  another woman  into the
household to bear children and carry out the other tasks assigned to females. A more important
event is the birth of a grandson, which signals the continuation of the family line.
All those born into the household have a claim on the household estate to help establish them in
life.  Sons,  of  course,  inherit property  directly,  and  it is the  responsibility  of the  father  and
brothers to  use household  resources to arrange for daughters' marriages.  These claims do not
expire with formal transfer of property, as brothers are responsible for looking after unmarried
siblings and launching them in adult life. After marriage, a girl continues to visit her natal home
and receive the ritual and material supports due to her, whether or not her brothers have divided
their property. It is rare for brothers to refuse to provide this support, and such refusal would be
viewed as a scandalous infraction of norms. Parents, too, have a claim to support by their sons.
Thus the sons' claim over their property is far less complete than that of a heir in a stem family
system, since the other members of the household continue to hold residual claims on the estate.
4It is common for married brothers to live together for some part of the household lifecycle, and
form separate households gradually as their own children grow. Thus parents may live together
with more than one married son and the unmarried children, or they may live with only one son.
On the ground, the composition  of the household may be very  similar  in the joint  and stem
family  systems, consisting for  example of a  nuclear  family with  or without  grandparents in
residence. However, the normative underpinning of the system is quite different: in the North
European  stem family,  where  the  residual  claims  of other household  members  are  minimal
compared to the situation in the Chinese or North Indian  joint family.
Here we term the latter a "corporate ethic", since all the members of the family are perceived as
having claims to the family resources. The important point is that the household functions as a
corporation,  with  the  men  of  different  generations  forming  the  central  members  of  the
corporation and the birth of sons ensuring its continuity from one generation to another. Women
have primary rights of maintenance from their parents' household before marriage and from their
husband's household after marriage, with continuing rights to visit and receive help in lifecycle
rituals from her parents' family. The main point is to ensure the continuity of the family  rather
than the household / estate, and the estate is managed such that the family can meet its-goals.
This system, too, is patrilineal. In the absence of sons, the preferred option is to adopt a son from
a brother or other male relative of the husband. Adopting a son-in-law is a less preferred option,
since it brings in a male  from  outside the lineage. For the son-in-law, too,  this  is a difficult
option, because the strict laws of exogamy and residence require that women go to live with their
husbands. A man from another village is an anomaly, a person who has no intrinsic right to be a
member of the village, a "wild duck" (as opposed to a home-grown duck) as they are sometimes
called in Anhui province  of China (Xie  1997), or a "house-bridegroom" as they are called in
North India. These are very humiliating names for a man.
Of course, there is a great deal of variation on the ground in the operation of family systems. In
stem  families,  there  is  much  variation  in  the  strictness  with  which  the  basic  principle  of
unigeniture is applied  as opposed to  giving other children  some minor share  of the property.
Besides, it does  not necessarily  follow  from the principle of unigeniture  that  the transfer of
property and  managerial  authority  should  be  sudden  as  opposed  to  gradual,  from  father to
appointed heir. The transfer seems to have been discontinuous in Northern Europe, but in other
cultures it could be gradual without compromising the main principle of keeping the estate intact,
as in Japan 5. In the latter case intergenerational relationships are likely to be smoother, despite
unigeniture.
The Korean family system is a good example of one which is difficult to classify into the above
neat categories. The primary goal is similar to that of Chinese and North Indian joint families,
namnely  to maintain the continuity of the family line. Yet the family does not act as a corporate
group in the sarne way as a joint family, since inheritance is not equal between sons. The eldest
son inherits the main share of the property, and small shares are given to the other sons. As in
China and North India, unmarried siblings have residual rights in that the father or eldest brother
is responsible for arranging their marriages, even after the property has been transferred from the
father.
5  Carl  Mosk,  personal  communication.
5In other ways the Korean family behaves like a stem family, in that the parents are expected  to
live with the eldest son and primary heir, and once siblings have left the home their fate is
uncoupled  from that of the occupants  of the primary share  of the estate. Even today, despite  the
fact that nearly 85% of the population  of South Korea lives in urban areas and sons frequently
live and work far away from their place of birth, the tradition of being supported  by the eldest
son persists among  a high proportion  of families (Table 1). The eldest son carries on the famnily
line, and the other sons set up their own separate  family lines. If there is no grandson  from the
eldest son, then another son may be used to continue  the family line and inherit  the main share of
the property. As in China and North India, the birth of a grandson is a much more significant
event in the household  lifecycle  than a son's marriage: women are imported into the family to
bear children  and work for the household.
II  FAMILY SYSTEMS  AND INTRAFAMILY RELATIONS
Rules of residence and inheritance  play an important  role in shaping intrafamily  relations. For
example, the relationship  between generations  is strongly affected by whether the transfer of
property and managerial authority is sudden or gradual. Where the transfer is sudden, the
younger generation  can resent the parents  for refusing  to retire, since until then they remain  in a
highly subservient  position in the household  and cannot  establish  themselves  as full adults in the
community.  The parents, of course,  have a strong  interest in retaining control of the property as
long as possible,  since  once it is handed  over their own  position  becomes  more vulnerable.  After
retirement, the  resentment at  having to  support the  aged couple could result in  neglect,
"especially  when they have reached  the age when they can no longer work; then it is no longer
hidden that the  young wish them  a  quick departure" (Gaunt  1983:262, quoting from a
contemporary  observer in eighteenth  century Sweden).  Plakans  summarizes  the literature  on the
treatment  of the old: "there is now something  like a consensus  that the treatment of the old was
harsh and decidedly  pragmatic. Dislike and suspicion,  it is said, characterized  the attitudes of
both sides (1989:177).  After all, the fundamental  ethos is for the heir to have full control of the
estate  uncomplicated  by residual  claims  of others.
In the joint family, the transfer of property and managerial  authority  is more gradual, allowing
sons to attain social adulthood  while remaining  members  of the father's household.  The parents
relinquish authority only gradually,  retaining some authority over household decision-making
well into their old age. Thus their position  in the household  does not undergo the sudden  loss of
status and power associated  with retirement  in the North European  stem family. Thus there is far
less scope for intergenerational  tension  in the joint family system.  The other side of this coin is
that age hierarchies  are a more central  feature  of life, with the old exercising  some authority  over
the young  over much of their life.
The position  of women is also very different  in the stem and  joint family systems  described  here.
As mentioned  above, the position of a wife in the North European  peasant family is that of the
partner of the husband: together they constitute a unit which runs the family enterprise. The
conjugal unit seems to have been the most important  one in economic, social and emotional
terms. The couple was the joint enterprise,  recruiting  help as needed through childbearing  and
hiring labour. Though women came from outside the  husband's home, they came as the
6important and explicitly acknowledged partner in the husband's enterprise. Thus a premium was
placed on a close conjugal partnership.
In the Chinese and North  Indian joint  family, the central bond  is that between patrikin, both
intergenerationally (between parents and children)  and intragenerationally  (between  siblings).
Consequently, there is far less emphasis on the conjugal unit, which is seen as a potential threat
to these other bonds. Through various means, the conjugal bond is discouraged from flourishing:
by separating women from men all day in their place of work, and creating separate worlds for
men and women to function in, in which senior men exercise authority over younger men, and
senior women over younger women.
Relationships between siblings are also likely to be quite different in the two systems described
here. In the joint family, siblings have more incentive to cooperate for their mutual benefit, not
only while the property remains joint,  but also afterwards, since they have residual rights  and
duties to  fulfill  towards  one  another.  In  the North  European  stem  family,  there  is  far  less
incentive for siblings to cooperate, since each has to make their own way in life and has little
claim  on  or  obligation  to  another.  The  obligations  of  parents  to  children  are  also  more
circumscribed in this family system, since children do not have claims to the estate through the
fact of their birth. It was common in Northern Europe for parents to send children out to work for
other families and live with them instead of at home, in what has been termed "the circulation of
servants" (Hajnal 1982).  By contrast in joint famnilies,  excess family labour is not dealt with in
this  fashion: people  remain  members of the household  and  are either  underemployed  in the
family enterprise or seek work outside to supplement the family income. The exception to this is
that  girls may be jettisoned from the household if it is suffering from very serious duress, as
during a famine.
The basic unit in the Chinese and North Indian joint family is the household, not the couple, as in
the North European stem family. The corporate group is recruited almost exclusively through the
male  line. Women  marry into  lineages  other than their  own, while  men  constitute the next
generation of their own lineage. Thus it is men who constitute the social order, and women are
marginal to it.  A woman is transferred to her husband's lineage upon marriage, and her own
family  gives up virtually all rights to her subsequent productivity. In her husband's home, her
task is essentially biological: to bear children and to work. The social aspect of her persona is
minimal, since it hardly matters which woman  gave birth to  a child: a child derives its social
identity by dint of its position in its father's lineage. Thus women are interchangeable, and an
individual  woman  can  in  principle  be  replaced  by  another  if  necessary.  Age  and  gender.
hierarchies are intrinsically stronger in this joint family system than in the North European stem
family, as these are the central pillars of the system.
III  IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND MORTALITY
In this section, we put forward some hypotheses about how the position of different categories of
people in the North European stem family system and the patrilineal joint family system might
influence  their  health  and  longevity.  These  hypotheses  largely  remain  to  be  tested.  Some
empirical data are presented which have a bearing on the hypotheses.
7Mortality  differentials  between  siblings:
We would expect to find larger mortality differentials between siblings who survive childhood,
in the stem family system than in the joint  family. This is to be expected because those who do
not inherit property or inherit a minor share of the property are likely to be pushed down the
socio-economic  hierarchy  and  be  exposed  to  greater  risk  of  disease  and  death.
Intergenerationally, these inequalities between siblings are likely to increase, as the life chances
of children of labourers are even poorer than that of their parents, who at least began life in a
more affluent  household.  Hajnal  (1982)  shows, as  we would  expect,  that  the probability  of
becoming a labourer is far higher among the children of labourers than the children of peasants.
Thus non-heirs /  lesser heirs  can be  viewed as being encouraged to  die out,  whether by not
surviving to reproduce, being unable to acquire the resources to marry, marrying too late to have
many children, or through poorer ability to provide for their children.
During phases of history  when opportunities  outside the agrarian  sector were  growing, some
children who leave the household may actually have stood a chance of becoming wealthier than
the family heir. However, until this century mortality levels in urban  areas were much higher
than in rural areas, so even if they were economically successful they may have been exposed to
higher mortality risks.
By  contrast  in  joint  families,  there  is  far  less  social  and  economic  differentiation  between
siblings, who share both poverty  and affluence to a  large extent.  This means, of course, that
when resources are slender there may be elevated mortality in the group as a whole, instead of
among a subset of the group as in the stem family. Although households restrict sons' marriage to
control reproduction, the unmarried  sons continue to be  producers  and  consumers within the
household,  and  therefore  differences  in  nutritional  and  environmental  stress  are  small  as
compared with their counterparts in stem families. This hypothesis is testable using data from
Northern Europe on the survivorship of siblings and comparing it with that from China or India
during similar phases of occupational structure.
By contrast, we hypothesize that in early childhood mortality differentials between siblings may
be wider in joint than stem family systems. This is because the greater claim of each child to
household resources in joint family systems may put greater pressure on the household to control
the  size and composition  of the sibling set.  Younger sib may receive  less  in  the  sense that
younger sons may have lower chances of marrying and less attractive matches may be found for
younger daughters if household resources are diminished, but they all have the right to live in the-
household and be supported by it. In the North European stem family, there is far less obligation
to provide for each child.
We do know that in China and North India there is considerable effort to control the size and
composition of the sibling set (Figures 1-3). Children of higher parity face a much greater chance
of abortion, infanticide and death from neglect. This is true of boys, despite the high premium on
having sons in these cultures. It is even more true of girls, as discussed below. This is a major
source of differentials in the life chances between members of the same sibling set in patrilineal
joint family systems of China and North India.
Of course, it is a long step from saying that stem family households have lower obligations to
their children, to saying that they would be unconcerned about their family size. To begin with,
8they have an obligation to raise a child at least until it is old enough to leave home. Since most of
the children leave home, both the costs and the benefits of childbearing are lower  in the stem
family than in the joint family system. This hypothesis about different pressure to control family
size is testable using data  from Europe and China or North  India.  Some excess mortality  of
higher birth order girls has also been recorded in nineteenth century Germany (Klasen  1994).
The differential in Germany is relatively small as compared with North India and China (Figures
1 and 2), and this may be attributable partly to fertility differentials and partly to differences in
family systems.
Effects of gender inequality:
Although the European and Asian family systems discussed here are all patrilineal in inheritance
and patrilocal in residence,  women are structurally more disadvantaged in the patrilineal joint
family system. This is because the primary unit is the corporate group which consists of male
patrikin. Women are at the bottom of two hierarchies:. the gender hierarchy  as well as the age
hierarchy. A young bride enters her husband's family as a marginal person with little autonomy.
Layers  of people  are above her  in  the  decision-making hierarchy:  not  only  the  men  of the
household, but also the women who are senior to her. By contrast in the North European stem
family, women are subservient to their husbands, but not to anyone else in the household. The
relative absence of an age hierarchy means that the woman has considerable autonomy in the
running of the household. With the acquiescence only of her husband, she is in a position to act
on her  perceptions  of  her  own needs  and  those  of her  children,  to  protect  their  health  and
well-being as seems desirable and the household resources allow.
The powerlessness of women in the patrilineal joint family system of China and North India is at
its peak during the early phases of a woman's marriage, which are the peak childbearing years.
These are the years when a woman is subject to the stresses of reproduction, and her children are
very  young  and  vulnerable.  This  is  especially  unfortunate  for  maternal  and  child  health
outcomes. If a woman perceives a problem with her reproductive health or feels that her child is
unwell, she may not be able act on this perception effectively. She may hesitate to mention it,
and even when she mentions it the matter will be considered by those senior to her before action
is taken. Such delay is especially critical for very young children, whose life can be jeopardized
by delay in receiving care. In Punjab in North India, the infant mortality rate of children born in
their father's home is nearly double that  of those  born in the mother's  parental home, where
women are freer to act on their perceptions of their needs and those of their children (Table 2). A
similar  phenomenon  can be  seen  in  China,  where  children  in  nuclear  families  have  lower
mortality than those in more complex households, controlling for socio-economic factors (Ren
1996).
Women themselves also suffer from greater reproductive stress because they are not in a position
to take decisions about their own care if they are in their husband's home. For example, in North
India they are not  free to  decide  to eat more nutritionally  dense  food  during pregnancy  and
lactati°5  Thus  even  in  an  affluent  and  well-nourished  State  like  Punjab,  women  are
undernourished during pregnancy and lactation (Figure 4).  They are similarly handicapped in
making decisions about obtaining medical care during pregnancy and at childbirth. This results
5Jeffery  et al.(l989), Das Gupta (1995b).
9in  elevated  levels of  maternal  mortality  even where  medical  facilities  are easily  accessible.
Doctors are often called upon when it is already too late to save the woman. It is interesting to
note that in late nineteenth century England women had lower mortality than men even during
the peak childbearing years, although levels of fertility were high at the time. By contrast, the
data from China and India show higher mortality of women during the childbearing years, and
this differential narrows as fertility declines.
These negative health outcomes are not necessarily volitional. They take place because of delays
in communication and the participation in crucial decision-making by people who are not in a
position to really assess the nature of the threat. Of course, any potential threats to the health of
adult males  are approached  with much more care, as they are the crucial components of the
social  order.  This  explains  why,  for  example, in  a  household  in  Punjab  which  assiduously
arranged for the elderly grandfather to receive injections of vitamin B to strengthen him, a wife
haemorrhaged to death during childbirth because by the time she was taken to a doctor it was too
late to save her.
Other kinds of negative health outcomes are more clearly volitional. One example of this is the
substantially elevated mortality of girls born into families where there is already a girl. This can
be seen in China, North India and South Korea (Figures 1-3). It is achieved by manipulating the
sex ratio  at birth  through  sex-selective  abortion  and  infanticide,  and  higher  child mortality
largely through  delays in  obtaining medical  care in  illness. The kinship  system ensures that
daughters are largely a drain on household resources: leaving home when they are old enough to
become productive  and having their productivity transferred to their husband's household. The
volitional nature of the discrimination is clearly indicated by the fact that the discrimination is
not experienced equally by all girls. As a consequence of such discrimination, some 70 per 1000
girls are "missing" in South Korea and China, a very high rate of loss as compared with the child
mortality rates in these  countries (Table 3). By comparison, there is  little evidence of excess
female child  mortality in  countries  such as the Philippines  (Arnold  1997) which have  more
bilateral kinship systems.
In patrilineal joint family systems, the pressure to remove higher birth order girls increases as
family  size declines,  since  this  reduces  the  number  of  opportunities  to  bear  sons.  This  is
empirically the case in China, South Korea and India 6. Excess  female mortality has also been
observed to rise in China and South Korea in times of war and famine (Das Gupta and Li 1997).
Unfortunately the poor quality of age-reporting in the data from India makes it more difficult to
see whether there is a similar impact of war and famine on gender differentials in mortality in-
India.
The position of the old:
It is unclear whether we can expect differential exposure to mortality in old age in stem and joint
family  systems. Of course,  to  the extent that  some siblings  move  down the  socio-economic
hierarchy in the stem family system, there is elevated mortality of some of the old. It is less clear
whether we  should expect  elevated mortality  of  retired heads  of  households  of  comparable
socio-economic status in the two family systems.
6  Das Gupta (1987, 1997),  Das Gupta and Li (1997).
10What we can expect in stem families is likely to depend on whether inheritance is sudden (as in
Northern  Europe) or gradual  (as in Japan). In the latter case, the position  of the old  can be
hypothesized  to  be  similar  to  that  in  joint  family  systems,  as  there  is  likely  to  be  less
intergenerational conflict over the inheritance and the old do not face a sudden loss of power and
authority.  In the joint  family  system,  old  people  are likely  to  obtain  greater  emotional  and
physical  support, and  also perhaps  greater access to  financial support  in  an  emergency than
might have been forthcoming for retired parents in the stem family system.
The accounts of the position of the old in North Europe suggest tension  and hostility, but we
must remember that historical documents tend to be drawn up in cases of conflict. The appalling
precision  of the retirement  contracts,  leaving apparently so little room  for  affect  and mutual
concern, may have been drawn up in the more conflict-ridden farmilies.  People who had more
trust in each other may have been less likely to document this fact for posterity to read.
We  also  know that  in  North  European  societies,  in  which  intergenerational  relations  were
characterized by conflict, relatively low proportions of the elderly lived with their children even
in preindustrial times. One of the higher estimates of the proportion of elderly living with their
children comes from Robin's (1984) study of an English village in 1851-71, where half the aged
with surviving children lived with a child. In India in 1987-88, 80% of the elderly live with their
children (Hashimoto 1991). This aspect of family systems changes slowly even with extensive
urbanization  and  industrialization,  as  can be  seen  in  contemporary  Japan  and  South Korea.
Nevertheless, it is not clear to what extent lower levels of emotional and physical support should
be expected to translate into increased risk of mortality.
Reproductive behaviour and health:
Much has been written  about how different family systems influence childbearing behaviour.
Davis (1955) argued that the logic of the joint family system would make for higher fertility than
the European system, because only the latter had a "nuptiality valve" regulating population to the
available resource base. In  stem families, individuals  are responsible for their  own economic
situation, and have to acquire an adequate resource base in order to marry and have children.
When the resource base is thin, many of them are unable to marry and reproduce,  and many
others woull'i marry late  and have a short reproductive career. By contrast, in joint  families a
couple is absorbed into a larger economic enterprise in which the responsibility of making ends
meet  is  a  shared responsibility  of  the larger  household.  Thus,  Davis  argued,  there  are few
disincentives to high fertility. Hajnal (1982) concurs with Davis' argument.
This argument may need some modification, as it arguably focuses too narrowly on the couple as
the decision-making unit. This  may be  valid for the North  European family,  but  not  for the
patrilineal joint family of China and North India. There is growing evidence that in the latter type
of family system, the household may seek to  regulate its reproduction  to  avoid threats  to its
continued economic viability. For example, it is widely noted in India that household members
influence  a  couple's  decisions  about  childbearing,  and  thereby  participate  in  making joint
decisions about household fertility. Another way to regulate fertility at the household level is to
regulate  marriage, and  there  is  evidence from  both  China  and  North  India that  households
regulated the marriage of their men such that some married late or never married, especially in
11poorer families 7. This pattern emerges  clearly  from data from Northeastern China for the period
1792-1873  (Lee and Feng 1997).  In both India  and China,  marriage  has typically  been earlier  and
more universal  for women than for men, as excess  female  child mortality  generates  a shortage  of
women.
A study in North India found that a high proportion of men of the landowning  caste never
married, and that this proportion increased with rising population pressure on resources, from
13% of men unmarried in  1921 to 23% in  1969 (Das Gupta 1995a). Genealogies show that
families  with several  sons surviving  to adulthood  were most likely  to discourage  their marrying,
especially  if they already had a small landholding.  By contrast,  the proportions  never marrying
among  men of the landless  labourer  caste were much lower, at around 5%. This can be attributed
to the fact that, unlike the landowning  caste, they did not have clearly defined property which
subdivided  visibly if marriage was not regulated. For the landless labourers,  the perception  of
population  pressure was diffused because they did not own specific productive  resources and
depended  on the generalized  security  of patron-client  relations  for their livelihood.
A similar  pattern was found in Italy (Kertzer 1991).  Between 1861 and 1921 as many as 16% of
males among  sharecropper  families  never married:  men were discouraged  from marrying  if there
were several  brothers in the family "since a point could be reached where the number of family
members  would become too great for the farm to support".  As in North India, marriage rates
were higher among  agricultural  labourers.  These studies suggest  more control of reproduction  in
the  joint family  system  than Davis and Hajnal  had assumed.
There are several  paths through  which family system's shaping  of childbearing  behaviour  could
impact on health outcomes in several ways, and some hypotheses  are put forward here in the
hope that they may be tested empirically.  A well-known  path from fertility to mortality  is that
high fertility takes a toll on women's health and is associated with higher rates of maternal
morbidity  and mortality.  One could  hypothesize  that there may  be less control  on marital fertility
in a stem family system such as that of North Europe, since the household  has less obligation  to
its children  than in the  joint family  household.  In the former,  excess children  could be sent out of
the household  to make their own way in life, and in this case the household's  obligations  to the
child cease when it leaves home. In joint families, the household has the responsibility  of
managing  the long-term  viability  of the entire unit, and all members  born into it have a claim to
its resources  to help establish  them in life. Sons have a claim to an inheritance,  the chances of
survival  over time.  and daughters  have a claim to be raised and have their marriage  arrangements
taken care of.
A second path from fertility  behaviour  to mortality  outcomes  is that surplus  children  may obtain
less help to thrive and to survive.  Here one could  hypothesize  that elevated levels of mortality  in
later childhood  and young adulthood  might be associated  with the Northern European  system  of
sending  children  out of the household.  In joint family systems,  there might be elevated  mortality
in infancy, as a form of postnatal control of family size, in order to avoid havi-ng  too many
claimants  on household  resources.
A third path is through the interaction  of inheritance systems with mortality. Compared with
unigeniture,  systems which allow for multiple heirs may be expected to generate more equal
7  Lee and Campbell  (1997), Li and Lavely  (1995) and Das Gupta (1995a).
12chances of survival within  a given generation. Over generations,  however,  they may  lead to
excessive subdivision of holdings and reduced survival chances for the kinship group as a whole.
This is especially relevant in agrarian settings where the size of landholdings is such a crucial
resource for survival. Through much of human history, mortality peaks from  crises may have
obviated the impact of subdivision of holdings, but since the advent of steady mortality decline
during this century, serious reduction in size of landholdings has been observed in both China
and India.
IV  MANAGEMENT  OF RESOURCES
Whether  the family  system  is  premised on  a  "lifeboat  ethic"  or  a  "corporate  ethic"  affects
patterns of cooperation and conflict, and therefore may have considerable implications for the
resource management strategies of groups and of individual households. Below we summarize a
few hypotheses on these links.
Migration:
In joint  family  systems,  migration  as part  of  an overall  household  strategy for  diversifying
sources of income and thereby spreading risk of failure of any particular source of income. The
migrants typically retain their property rights in their place of origin, and frequently also leave
their wives and children behind. This minimizes their costs in the place  of migration. It  also
permits the migrant's  spouse and children to continue  generating income from  their property,
from labour opportunities,  as well  as from the common property  resources  in  their place  of
origin. The household  of origin can also  subsidize the migrants to tide  them  over periods  of
difficulty when they are between jobs. When they are earning, they send remittances back home,
which can be used to  smooth consumption flows or invested for future returns.  Thus we  can
expect to find more circular migration in regions where the family system gives people greater
claim to family resources (Das Gupta 1987).
By contrast, in the stem family system, migration is likely to be essentially that of individuals,
who are seeking their own livelihood. In this situation, there is little reason for people to retain a
link with their  home area, unless this  is administratively required by the  State. One possible
reason may be access to commnon  property resources, if such access is limited to people who are
born into a particular territory.
Labour management:
Stem family  systems certainly allow for much more flexibility  of labour management.  Since
children whose labour is not required can be sent out of the household when they are old enough
to leave home, households can minimize problems of under-employment. When necessary, they
can hire in labour to tide them over difficult periods. The one difficult point in the household
lifecycle may be  when the property is transferred  and most  of the  siblings leave,  which can
create a temporary vacuum of labour in the household (Smith 1977). By contrast, joint household
systems are more prone to having members under-employed.
13Household regeneration after a crisis:
The scope for regeneration of households may be greater in joint family systems. When mortality
was high and sudden mortality peaks could decimate households, it must have been a frequent
occurrence that households lost most of their working-age adults and became unviable. In such a
situation, it is relatively easy for households to be reconstituted in joint family systems, because
the underlying notion of the sublineage as a corporation makes it easy for uncles to team up with
nephews, or with more distant relatives. Since people have residual rights of kin in the property
of their cousins and more distant kin, it is relatively easy to reconstitute households which may
earlier have divided. Many instances  of such reconstitution  can be found  in the life-histories
accompanying genealogies in Northern India. It is possible that households were more prone to
becoming unviable  in stem family  systems, because kin  did  not  share  a common  interest in
property, and therefore had were fewer built-in mechanisms for reconstituting households once
they had separated.
Commercial strategies:
Compared with stem families, there is greater scope for cooperation and mutual trust amongst
members of a joint family "corporation", which facilitates using household networks as a way of
spreading risk and maximizing income from different sources. This has already been discussed in
the context of migration. These strategies also facilitate certain forms of commerce. This can be
seen, for example, amongst overseas Chinese and Indian communities, which find it possible to
conduct  business  on  a  global  scale  using  family  networks.  This  can  give  them  powerful
commercial advantages over those who cannot tap into existing networks of trust. At the same
time,  these  systems  have  less  flexibility  than  non-family  based  systems,  for  purposes  of
recruitment and rewarding of enterprise. This can make them uncompetitive for certain forms of
large modem business organization which need to be able to motivate professional managers by
offering them opportunities for advancement regardless of their kinship links.
CONCLUSIONS
There  is  enormous  variation  in  family  forms,  which  makes  it  difficult  to  use  simple
classifications such as "stem" family and "joint" family. The Korean family system, for example,
has features of stem organization in termns  of inheritance, but is very similar to the Chinese and
North Indian joint family in that the main objective is the continuation of the patrilineage rather
than of the household. Thus in Korea siblings may face very different life-chances, as they do in
stem family systems since inheritance is not equal between sons, but age and gender hierarchies-
operate in ways similar to that of patrilineal joint families.
Some  features  of  kinship  systems  are  of  especial  consequence  for  demographic  outcomes.
Amongst these are the nature of claims on the household estate of different categories of family
members; whether inheritance is egalitarian or not; the rules of residence; and the arrangements
for transfer of property and managerial authority from one generation to another. These go far
towards shaping intrafamilial relationships: whether the conjugal bond is primary or subsidiary
to  that  between  patrikin,  the  relationships  between  siblings  and  between  parents  and  their
children.
14If property  is  unequally  divided,  siblings have  very  different  life-chances,  with  some being
exposed to greater risks of mortality and facing more constraints in forming households of their
own and raising children successfully. If managerial authority is transferred suddenly, this makes
for greater  intergenerational  conflict. If  the primary  unit is  the  patrilineal  corporate  group,
females  are marginalized  and their  life-chances  are reduced.  Circumstances  may  sometimes
generate  fairly  similar  household  composition  in  stem  and joint  family  systems,  but  their
demographic outcomes will be very different, as these are shaped by the very different moral and
structural underpinnings of the two family systems.
Until  recently,  the  literature  focused  more  on  the  fertility  implications  of  different  family
systems, rather than mortality or migration. However, the effect  of family  systems on health
outcomes  may  be  greater  and  more  persistent  than  that  on  fertility.  Unlike  the  conscious
evaluation of fertility behaviour, the normns  regarding the evaluation and treatment  of different
household members are driven by ideas deeply embedded in our societies' cultural constructs, of
which we are often not conscious. Even if such evaluation is reflected only in differentials in the
speed of seeking health care, this  can translate into significant differences in mortality. This is
illustrated here with a few examples from North India, China and South Korea.
Of course, while joint  family systems may have smoother intra-familial relationships than stem
family systems, they are likely to have sharper conflict between groups. Faction fighting between
lineages is endemic in Northern India, for example. In China, lineages  sometimes became so
powerful that the  state found it difficult to  exert authority  over them.  Recent  accounts from
China suggest that this is beginning to happen once again, with lineage-based villages thwarting
state  efforts  to  enforce  the  law  against  one  of  their  members 8 . This  suggests  that  the
arrangements  of civil  society  may be  more difficult  to  generate and  sustain  in joint  family
settings.
There is considerable evidence that the values and constructs of kinship  systems change very
slowly, even in the face of industrialization and urbanization. For example, Japan, South Korea
and  Westem  Europe  are  all  highly  industrialized  and  urbanized  today.  Yet  they  differ
enormously in the proportion of the elderly living with their children. These large and persistent
differences in the extent to  which the aged receive physical, emotional  and financial  support
from their children seem to be closely related to the structure of intergenerational relationships in
the peasant societies from which these industrialized societies have emerged. In this paper, we
have put  forward  a  few  hypotheses  about  how  family  systems  may  influence  demographic
processes  and  behaviours.  Our understanding  of these  processes  will  be  much  enhanced  as-
research proceeds on the nature of family systems.
s  Zhang and Li (1993), Hu Jingsheng,  personal communication.
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18Table  1:  Sources of financial support in old age, South Korea, 1995
Urban  Rural  Whole Country
Self support  40.9  22.1  37.6
Eldest son  29.9  48.4  33.1
Second son  7.0  10.4  7.6
All sons  8.8  7.9  8.7
Daughters  1.6  1.5  1.6
Sons and daughters  11.4  9.6  11.1
together
Other  0.3  0.1  0.3
Source: Republic  of Korea,  National  Statistical  Office,  Social  Indicators  in Korea, 1995:  231, based on
National  Statistical  Office,  Social  Statistics  Survey.
Table  2:  Infant mortality rates by place of delivery, Khanna, 1984-88 (deaths in
the first year of life, per 1,000 live births)
Place of Delivery  0 months  1-11 months  0-11 months
Mother's home  15  31  37
Husband's home  34  67  86
Source: Das Gupta. 1995(b).  Lifecourse  perspectives  on women's autonomy  and  health outcomes,
American Anthropologist 97(3): 481-491.Table 3: Number of girls "missing" per thousand livebirths
China, 1989-90  South Korea, 1992  India, 1981-91
No. of excess deaths  13  _  36
age 0-4, per 1000
female livebirths'
No. of excess  48-81  70  9
abortions per 1000
female livebirths 2
Total number of girls  61-94  70  45
missing per  1000
female livebirths
Total number of girls  30-46  34  22
missing per  1000
livebirths (m + f)
0-4 mortality rate,  61  14-17  109-119
19 9 1  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Note: 1. Computed  from the sex differential  in recorded  mortality,  compared  with West  model
life  tables  for the prevailing  life expectancy.
2. Computed  from  the recorded  sex  ratio at birth,  assuming  a normal  ratio of 106.
Sources:  (a) Sex  differentials  in mortality:  China:  Huang  and Liu (1995);
India: Sample  Registration  System  of India.
(b) Sex  ratios at birth: China: 1990  Census  of China  (the lower estimates  are based  on
Zeng  Yi et al.'s (1993)  recalculation  of the 1990  figures);
S.Korea:  Park and Cho (1995);
India:  intercensal  estimates  for India  from Das Gupta  and Bhat (1997).
(c) Child  mortality  rate: China:  Lin Liangmin  et.al.(1996);
S  .Korea:  Korean  life tables  (lower  estimate)  and vital statistics
(higher  estimates);
India:  International  Institute  for Population  Science  (1995)
report on NHFS  survey  in India.Figure  1
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